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Abstract
In the 40s of the 19th century Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) was considered 
one of the greatest writers of Polish Romanticism. On top of that, he was one of the 
most recognizable Poles in Europe with strong political involvement, known for 
opposing any forms of political despotism. In the era of the European Revolution 
of 1848-1849 he entered the realm of politics with significant impetus and among 
all else was counting on the Balkans to become one of the main stages of an anti-
Austrian campaign, being convinced that especially among the Croatians there 
is a strong potential and willingness to rebel. His ideas on this area collided with 
Austro-Slavism and several other views and were finally defeated with Jelačić’s 
policy. The collapse of the liberation movements in Central Europe for him 
was due to the consequence of the lack of profound cooperation between the 
enslaved nations and he saw it as a triumpf of destructive egoism over solidarity.
Key words: Adam Mickiewicz, anti-Austrian movement, Revolution 1848, 
Balkan, Slavic nations
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Introduction
In the 40s of the 19th century Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) was considered 
one of the greatest writers of Polish Romanticism. On top of that, he was one of 
the most recognizable Poles in Europe. Being politically involved from a young 
age, in the 20s he was exiled to Russia for five years. He was known for opposing 
any forms of political despotism. In the era of the European Revolution of 1848-
1849 he once again entered the realm of politics with significant impetus. In 
1848 in Rome, observing the outbreak of the revolution and the proliferation 
of national movements from Paris, through Italy, German countries, Vienna, 
Prague up to Greater Poland (Wielkopolska region) he came to a conclusion that 
the time for long-awaited change of order in Europe established back in 1815 
during the Congress of Vienna had arrived. According to his vision, Central 
Europe was to become the main center of changes, as Mickiewicz perceived 
Austria as the weakest link among the European empires which had executed 
the partition of Poland. The destruction of Austria was supposed to be the 
starting point of the big change. He expected the war with Austria initiated by 
Charles Albert, the king of Sardinia, and rebellious regions from northern Italy 
including Lombardy and Tuscany, the background of which was constituted by 
revolutionary proclamations in Vienna and Prague, will receive support from 
the French republican government as well as the moral protectorate of the 
new pope Pius IX. This was supposed to eventually lead to the collapse of the 
Habsburg monarchy. Therefore, Mickiewicz started organizing a Polish legion 
in Rome, which he assumed could soon become a Slavic legion, a significant 
Central European military force. He hoped that the legion together with the 
Italian and French armies would reach Kraków within months or even weeks, 
resulting in the possibility of establishing Polish Piemont, the beginning of an 
independent state. Mickiewicz’s another expectation was that the revolutionary 
wave would weaken Prussia and send ripples inside the Russian empire, bringing 
about a change in the character of the country’s policy, especially that Bakunin 
had assured Mickiewicz and other Polish emigrants that it was a realistic option 
as Russia was teeming with internal conspiracies (Weintraub, 1998: 140-162).       
Discussion
Such a combination of events could indeed lead to Poland’s full restitution, 
fulfilling the poet’s dreams. He prepared an ideological document for the legion 
called The collection of rules, which in the future was to become the basis for 
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a constitution. The revolutionary document, postulating openness of all posts 
to the public, equal rights irrespective of one’s gender, ethnic origin or social 
background (including full political rights for, among others, Jews and women), 
the abolishing of censorship, an agrarian reform and, finally, full solidarity 
between free Slavic nations. In 1848, it was Slavic nations, especially the Poles, 
the Czechs and the inhabitants of the Balkans who played the pivotal role for 
Mickiewicz. Therefore, it is what I would like to concentrate on, leaving aside the 
details concerning the history of the aforementioned legion, as it is well-known 
and has been thoroughly investigated (Kieniewicz, 1998: 254-271).  
The legion was conceived of as an international undertaking, yet Slavic in 
its core. It was to gather not only the Polish emigrants and teenagers fleeing 
the annexed territories, but also Slavic prisoners of war from the Austrian army 
(there were several thousands of them there), as well as volunteers from Czech 
and Dalmatia (the poet used this ethnic name most frequently). For this reason, 
he kept appealing in Rome for permission to conscript these prisoners of war 
into the legion and attempted at propagating this idea among Austrian soldiers 
fighting in Italy, among which there were many Croatians and Czechs. However, 
he never managed to receive such permission from the government in Milan or 
the leaders of Piemont because they were solely interested in unifying Italy, but 
had no interest in the total destruction of the Habsburg monarchy. For similar 
reasons, the poet never received support for his idea in Paris, as the French 
Republic did not intend to export its revolution. In Paris the vision of French 
forces being sent to the Balkans which purportedly were about to rebel against 
Austria was treated as wishful thinking. 
It is confirmed that in the spring of 1848 Mickiewicz really counted on the 
Balkans to become one of the main stages of an anti-Austrian campaign and 
was thoroughly convinced that especially among the Croatians there is a strong 
potential and willingness to rebel. There are numerous testimonies to it, some 
of which are worth quoting. On 17 April 1848, Mickiewicz wrote a letter to 
Giuseppe Malmusi, the president of the government in Modena the following 
words: “The Polish military host unified in Rome around the national flag blessed 
by Pius IX is on its way to Poland, crossing Lombardy and the Slavic states. Our 
mission is to create a union of the Polish legion, which would, in turn, create a 
union of Slavic Legions. (…) We go to Milan where we shall wait for our Polish 
brothers who head there through Switzerland. From there, we shall appeal to 
the Poles conscripted to the Austrian army as well as all the other Slavs, our 
brothers: Dalmatians, Ilirians, Croatians, Czechs and Slovaks. They are all led 
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by the same Spirit. Soon you will hear the calling of this Spirit. You will see that 
the Spirit will become flesh. The whole Slavic fleet stationed in Livorno gave 
us a promise of help” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 511). Let me add that the last part 
of the message was largely exaggerated; the word concerning the legions was 
propagated among Slavo-Balkan seamen but it brought rather meager results. 
Five days later, Mickiewicz wrote to Jules Bastide, the Foreign Affairs Minister of 
the republican government in Paris, as follows: “It is clear that countries which 
have no nations lack the vital element and will soon fall apart [the poet had in 
mind the Habsburg state] (…) It logically follows that the Austrian empire will 
cease to exist. The appropriate action for France is to acknowledge it, announce 
it and take relevant action. The French should reach out to the Slavic peoples, 
especially to Poland which is the centre of action for the sake of liberation. 
France was never effective in its actions undertaken in the north and will never 
be acting differently than through (the agency of ) Poland. The area that should 
attract France’s attention first is the Slavic coast of the Adriatic Sea, especially 
Triest, Zadar, Dubrovnik and Split. This is where the Slavic movement will break 
out, if it had not happened already. The peoples can be divided into two groups: 
one advocate a union with Venice which they vaguely recollect; others attempt at 
conceiving the Slavic nationality. It is paramount for France to act in this spirit. 
(…) It is pertinent to make use of the independence movement of Dubrovnik or 
any other coastal city and support it. Poles should be put on ships heading in 
that direction” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 523).
Another quotation comes from the letter to a temporary government of 
Lombardy, sent on 3 May 1848: “The rebirth of national movements, especially 
the fights Italians wage against Austria have shown the Polish emigrants that 
the time to take action has come. Acting arm in arm with Italians, Poles are 
coming closer to liberating their own country. They cooperate in attempts to 
dismantle the Austrian empire, which will liberate 5 million Poles subordinate 
to this empire. Additionally, they give the Slavic provinces of Iliria, Dalmatia 
and Croatia, all bordering Italy, the incentive to start acting towards their 
national interests. The movement of these provinces is politically linked to the 
movements of the Czech kingdom and those Slavic peoples who constitute the 
majority in the kingdom of Hungary. The direct aim of the Poles acting in Italy, 
however, should be tearing the Slavic element away from the Austrian army. (…) 
But in order to influence soldiers, one needs to have a flag under which one will 
fight. The Poles who were convinced about the gravity of the Slavic case for Italy 
and that the time is right gathered in the capital of Lombardy. (…) This is how 
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the Polish legion (of Dąbrowski) was once created. Initially comprising around a 
hundred soldiers and officers, after a few months it amounted to twelve thousand 
and the number was still counting, as Poles, Ilirians and Czechs flocked and 
joined them. And that was even before the era in which we live has arrived and 
bolstered the national feelings” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 537).   
Even though only 12 volunteers set off from Rome to Milan with Mickiewicz, 
knowing that in France emigrants were being conscripted he expected that 
the armed forces he was preparing would exceed in terms of both number 
and multinational character the 18th century legions of Jan Henryk Dąbrowski, 
which had eventually become a significant part of Napoleon’s army. In fact, his 
expectations were never fulfilled for a number of reasons. France did not get 
involved in the Italian-Austrian war and Radetzky’s soldiers started dominating, 
Milan fell and Charles Albert, the leader of Piemont made truce with the 
Austrians even before Mickiewicz’s legion was fully formed. The uprising in 
Greater Poland targeted at Prussia collapsed and rebellions in Vienna, Prague 
and Lvov were throttled. Mickiewicz’s initiative did not receive full support 
among the Polish emigration, either. The left-wing emigrants gathered around 
The Polish Democratic Association as well as Prince Czartoryski’s supporters 
opposed the idea. In turn, the youth from the annexed lands, having experienced 
the defeat of uprisings in Greater Poland and Galicja chose Hungary and General 
Bem’s army. Finally, funds were too scarce to equip and send volunteers willing 
to become a part of Mickiewicz’s legion. As a consequence, the number did not 
exceed 300 soldiers. 
Moreover, the poet was wrong about the possibility of an outbreak of an anti-
Austrian and pro-independence movement in the Balkans, where count Josip 
Jelačić enjoyed a strong position. As the main Croatian politician, the ban and the 
commander-in-chief of the army, he advocated close relations with the Austrian 
dynasty. He took part in throttling the rebellion in Vienna and in a campaign 
in Hungary where, paradoxically, he fought against General Bem’s army. 1848 
was the pinnacle of his political and military career. He was in charge of the 
regions of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, propelling the idea of great Croatia 
and initiating the process of integration of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and 
Dalmatia. Having put up strong resistance to the attempts of imposing on them 
Hungarian hegemony, he severed ties with Buda and led Croatian forces against 
the Hungarian government. This won him widespread support in Croatia, 
although there did exist opposition defying his policies and strong position in 
relation with the imperial court. He hoped for gaining broad autonomy within 
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the Habsburg monarchy without being at all dependent on Buda and with huge 
autonomy from Vienna. The last goal was not achieved. Once the Hungarian 
uprising was thwarted Vienna imposed a centralist system conceived of by Bach 
on all the provinces, including the South Slavs. Croatia had no other option than 
to accept a wave of Austrian civil servants. Jelačić kept the ban’s title until the 
rest of his life, however, after the collapse of the European Revolution of 1848-49 
his position strongly diminished. 
Historians, especially authors of synthetic analyses of the region’s history 
differ in their evaluations of his policy in the period of revolution. Dragutin 
Pavlicević defended the strategy taken by Jelačić: “Croatia began its fight for a 
country and a nation being put between Scylla from Vienna and Charybdis from 
Buda. So, if a historian is supposed to use a ‘what if ’ clause, the answer would be: 
if it had not been for Jelačić and the Croatian army in 1848, Croatia would have 
become a Hungarian district and would never have received the status it did 
receive when Hungarians signed the Croatian-Hungarian settlement in 1868” 
(Pavlicević, 2004: 251). Pavlicevic portrays ban Jelačić in a fashion typical of a 
protagonist of an ancient tragedy who, lacking a simple and easy choice, was still 
able to create facts and propel processes beneficial to his community in the long 
run. Barbara Jelavich saw positive aspects of the European Revolution of 1848-49 
for Croatia in different areas: “Nevertheless, the period was not totally lost. An 
agrarian reform was carried out and Zagreb became a seat of a bishop” (Jelavich, 
2005: 311). She did not evaluate Jelačić’s policy directly, but underscoring the 
debacle of Croatia’s hopes for autonomy she indirectly pointed at his failure. 
Polish historians, including Wacław Felczak and Tadeusz Wasilewski were more 
critical in their assessments, commenting on appointing Jelacić as the ban in the 
following fashion: “The new Croatian ban was supposed to be a military tool of 
reaction against the Hungarian revolution and simultaneously be the catalyst 
for the Croatian revolution. The hasty nomination of Jelačić for the ban and 
the commander-in-chief of the army stationed in Croatia and its borderlands 
significantly influenced the course of and the fate of the Croatian revolution. As 
a loyal servant of the Habsburg dynasty Jelačić understood the Croatian policy as 
being an anti-Hungarian demonstration by which he complied with the interests 
of the whole monarchy as well as his fellowmen from Iliria who maintained the 
anti-Hungarian program from the pre-revolution period” (Felczak, Wasilewski, 
1985: 324). Both historians considered the lifting of serfdom to be the biggest 
social achievement of the time, in which they agreed with Jelavich. Jerzy 
Skowronek, less directly than his predecessors put forward a thesis that Jelačić 
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had been used by Austrian reactionary politicians. He underscored, however, 
that the Hungarian side did not leave the Slavs, especially the South ones, 
including the Croatians, much room for maneuver. On top of that, Skowronek 
focused on the final consequences of the collapse of the European Revolution: 
“Vienna did not intend to respect the Slavic strive for independence. Instead, it 
strengthened the centralist policy, failing to comply with the rules delineated by 
the March constitution. Croatians gained their confirmation of independence 
from Hungary and the rights to use their national language as the official one, but 
did not get Vienna’s permission to merge Dalmatia with Croatia” ( Skowronek, 
Tanty, Wasilewski, 2005: 278). These incomplete gains were the legacy of the ban 
of Croatia.
*
Around the year 1848, among Croatians, especially the supporters of Jelačić’s 
policy, as well as in the circles of Czech elites the idea of Austro-Slavism started 
gaining popularity. It was a concept standing in opposition to the Russian 
concept of Pan-Slavism. The concept of Austro-Slavism was conceived of by the 
representatives of the Czech national movement, especially Francisek Palacky 
and a number of Mickiewicz’s acquaintances, including a writer Vaclav Hanka. 
It was presented during a famous Slavic Convention in Prague in 1848 and it 
was rather coolly received by the Poles present there (Mickiewicz was absent). 
The proponents of Austro-Slavism were opposed to the idea of dismantling the 
empire; they strove to reshape the Austrian Empire into a federation of nations 
enjoying equal rights under the reign of the Habsburgs. Obviously, Mickiewicz’s 
project ran counter to this idea. It assumed Austria’s defeat and collapse 
followed by the creation of a range of independent countries on the stretch of 
land between the Baltic and the Adriatic. These countries, most of which were 
to be Slavic, would be tied by solidarity and cooperation but would not form 
any kind of federation. Mickiewicz wanted to convince among others Vaclav 
Hanka to his idea, but it did not catch on with the Czechs and the conscription 
to the legion as far as Czech volunteers were concerned was very poor. The 
similar case was with Croatians and Mickiewicz himself admitted there were 
no representatives of this nation in the legion. Still, the Polish Romantic truly 
expected solidarity between the Slavs in the fight against the invaders. The last, 
15th point of an ethical-political manifesto of the legion penned by Mickiewicz 
under the title The composition of rules dealt with this issue: “Our brother Czech 
and its peoples, our brother Rus and its peoples deserve our political help, our 
familial help” (Mickiewicz, 1997: 11). Although the stress was put here on the 
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cooperation of the nations closest to the Poles in terms of geography (Czechs 
and Russians) for the sake of freedom, the overall overtone of the proclamation 
clearly encompasses a wider specter of nations. 
It remains unclear where Mickiewicz’s certainty that the uprising of the 
South Slavs against the Austrians was imminent came from. Researchers 
Henryk Batowski and Stefan Kieniewicz attempted to find the answer to this 
question but it is still uncertain. Mickiewicz was well-informed about the Balkan 
culture, politics, as well as national differences and dissimilarities. However, the 
information he was privy to might have been incomplete, the traces of which can 
be found in Paris lectures and the aforementioned letters in which he seems to 
treat Dalmatia and Croatia as entities related to each other, yet separate. Besides, 
he couldn’t have had the knowledge about the Balkan situation comparable to 
that of Prince Czartoryski who had his agents in Belgrade and carefully analyzed 
the political processes in the region in cooperation with the French government. 
As a matter of fact, Czartoryski even made endeavors to instigate certain actions 
in the region, among others trying to facilitate the communication between 
the Hungarians and the South Slavs during the European Revolution of 1848-
49. Mickiewicz became seriously conflicted with the members of Czartoryski’s 
faction in Rome in 1848 and, therefore, it is highly unlikely that he was informed 
about the actions they were taking at that time in the Balkans.
Mickiewicz’s conviction that the anti-Austrian uprising was imminent in 
the Adriatic Sea basin seems to stem from two facts. First of all, Mickiewicz 
firmly believed in the Slavs craving for freedom and he apparently wanted to 
see this tendency also among the South Slavs. Secondly, he might have been 
convinced into believing that by his Croatian acquaintances who were all young 
enthusiasts. One of them was Medo Pucić (born in 1821, also known under the 
name Pozzo Orsato), a poet from Dubrovnik writing in Croatian and Italian, 
who in 1848 sided with the Italian movements. Pucić, like Mickiewicz, believed 
that Risorgimento would open the door to freedom to all the Slavs. He met 
Mickiewicz several times in 1848 in Rome and Florence. Lubomir Durković-
Jaksić pointed to the young Croatian poet as Mickiewicz’s main informant 
concerning the liberation movements in the area of Croatia and Slovenia: 
“Most likely he received information about the situation in Dalmatia and Istria 
from Pucić and some seamen from that area which he contacted” (Durković-
Jaksić, 1984: 111). Undoubtedly, Mickiewicz pinned his hopes with him as far 
as propagating the idea among the Balkan nations. On 4 May 1848 the Polish 
Romantic tried to summon him to Milan in reference to this case and it is vital 
to quote his short yet very significant letter here:
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“Dear Sir, during my stay in Florence it was physically impossible for me to 
take full advantage of our meeting, which was so auspicious for me. I would 
like to consult you about the matters of highest importance. It is about – as you 
may feel – the matter of Slavic and Polish freedom. Could you possible come 
to Milan in a couple of days? If it is possible, please do not hesitate a moment. 
Meanwhile, please inform me whether you know any Dalmatian or Ilirian in 
Milan, a patriot capable of writing in his national language. Please respond at 
your earliest. Sincerely, Adam Mickiewicz” (Mickiewicz, 2004: 544).  
It is unknown whether Pucić fulfilled Mickiewicz’s request, though it is clear 
that at that time he indeed supported the Italian and Polish liberation aspirations 
and hoped for an anti-Austrian uprising at the Adriatic. Durković-Jaksić proved 
that Jelačić’s service suspected Pucić of taking actions whose outcome was 
to connect the liberation initiatives in the Balkans with the Italian case and 
to instigate South Slavs against Austria. He kept close relations with Ljudevit 
Gaj, a prominent intellectual, the leader of The Croatian National Rebirth 
movement and a publisher of his poetry. He was willing to become actively 
involved in organizing an anti-Habsburg political action and was convinced 
that Croatians can be talked into the war with the Austrian monarchy for the 
sake of full independence. “There is evidence that Gaj was soliciting for money 
necessary to topple Jelačić and lead Croatians to a war with Austria. Colonel 
Ludwik Bystrzonowski, an emissary of Prince Czartoryski and French Minister 
Jules Bastide took measures to reconcile Yugoslavs with Hungarians and ally 
Yugoslavs with Italians in the fight against Austria. (…) He spoke to Gaj and 
other opponents of Jelačić who intended to fight with Austria. According to 
his first report, sent to the French minister Bastide from Sremskie Karłowce 
on 22.11.1848, he and Gaj considered overthrowing Jelačić” (Durković-Jaksić, 
1984: 120). Therefore, it looks as if Gaj and his Croatian associates believed at 
the turn of 1848 in the possibility of reaching an agreement with Hungarians 
and instigating their society into a rebellion against Austria. However, one may 
doubt whether they stood realistic chances of executing such an action. 
Towards the end of 1848, on his way back from Italy to Dubrovnik, Pucić 
made a  longer stopover in Zagreb where he met Gaj. It is unknown whether 
they spoke about Mickiewicz’s actions and whether Pucić played any role in 
the secret negotiations that Gaj carried out with Czartoryski’s and the French 
government’s emissaries. A few months earlier, when he was in Italy, he could 
have been receiving information about anti-Austrian moods and conspiracies, 
possibly from Gaj’s circles in Zagreb, and passing them over to Mickiewicz. It 
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is also possible that Mickiewicz was not completely cut off from the knowledge 
that Czartoryski and his circle were privy to. After all, in the Slavic regions of 
the Balkans, including Croatia, there were numerous political circles which 
maintained a clear opposition to Vienna and the policy of Euro-Slavism. The 
poet could have learned about them prior to his departure to Rome from some 
people close to Czartoryski, whereas Medo Pucić might have elevated, if not 
even magnified Mickiewicz’s hopes. 
Pucić himself seems to have significantly changed his views in 1849 and, given 
the prolonged Croatian-Hungarian conflict, he turned to Jelačić and his policy. 
In March 1849 he published an article entitled Formiamo noi una nazione? in 
“L’Avvenire”, a newspaper issued in Dubrovnik. As Durković-Jaksić wrote: “He 
advocated the need of unity among the Yugoslavs living within the borders of 
Austria in the fight for making their national rights recognized and respected, 
under the supervision of a constitutional national government and with the 
help from the Czechs and Poles, which, in practical measures, meant nothing 
but supporting the existence of Austria. He condemned his fellow countrymen 
fighting for the freedom of other nations, calling it a waste of effort. At the same 
time, he understood Polish aspirations. He referred to them in the article and 
claimed that only Poles knew how to protect the dignity of their country fighting 
for the freedom of their own country and whole Europe under their own banners, 
wearing their national confederate caps” (Durković-Jaksić, 1984: 120). This way 
he also paid homage to Mickiewicz’s actions concerning the formation of the 
legion and indirectly explained that as a Croatian, in the present circumstances, 
he could not get involved in actions targeted at Austria. Another sign attesting 
to the change of his views was Pucić’s renowned poem Na slavu Jelacicia bana 
published in March 1849.  
Henryk Batowski (1980:51) aptly wrote: “Even if Mickiewicz’s action had been 
organized better and addressed to Croatians more appropriately, in that given 
moment it could not have succeeded”. The poet lost hope for a common Slavic 
rebellion against Austria in mid-1848 when ban Jelačić’s siding with Vienna 
started to indicate clearly the vectors of politics in the Balkans. On top of that, 
it was combined with a complete absence of signals pointing to the possibility 
of reaching a Slavic-Hungarian agreement and organizing a common crusade 
against the Austrian empire. 
The following year, in 1849 Mickiewicz as an editor of “La Tribune des 
Peuples” in Paris published a number of articles in which he ceased to raise the 
topic of South Slavs’ uprising and generally mentioned Balkan issues very rarely, 
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which means that he also did not directly criticize Jelačić’s policy. It is assumed 
that it was an effect of Mickiewicz’s contacts with Andrija Brlić, ban Jelačić’s 
emissary to Paris who got in touch with the editor of “La Tribune des Peuples” 
and attempted to throw a pro-Slavic light on the actions taken by the leader of 
his country1. Maybe Mickiewicz maintained some contact with Pucić and he 
took his point of view of that time into consideration? Even though Mickiewicz 
personally avoided this topic, other contributors to his newspaper wrote 
widely about the matters of South Slavs and their conflict with Hungarians. 
Some articles were directly reprinted from “Novine”, a  newspaper edited by 
Gaj. Durković-Jaksić (1984: 135-151) analyzed them thoroughly. They point 
out that the editors of “La Tribune” had a positive attitude to the Hungarian 
uprising; all the main battles and conflicts between Kossuth’s army (in which 
Polish officers and soldiers played significant roles) and Serbo-Croatian military 
units were covered in articles. At the same time, the undertones clearly indicated 
that there were hopes for an agreement between Hungarians and the leaders of 
South Slavs, which could change the course of history and push it towards the 
scenario desired by Mickiewicz. There were even voices whereby Poles would 
act as mediators in this conflict. Czartoryski’s circle made efforts to promote 
such a solution but to no avail. 
Andrija Brlić (born 1826), a young intellectual and Banovina’s emissary, 
was an enthusiast of Poland. He learned Polish in the forties and achieved such 
command that he read Mickiewicz’s most significant works. In 1849 in Paris 
he befriended a prominent Polish emigrant, writer Edmund Chojecki, who 
contacted him with Prince Czartoryski and President Ludwig Napoleon (later 
Napoleon III). He met Mickiewicz for the first time in 1849. The effect of this 
meeting was an article penned by Brlić which was published on the front page 
of the third issue of “La Tribune”2.  The text fostered the idea of establishing a 
federation of South Slavs whose centers would be Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana. 
He substantiated the sense of Croatians and Serbs fight with Hungarians whom 
1 Batowski wrote: “We may assume that Brlić talked to Mickiewicz about Jelacić’s attitude to 
Vienna. Brlić tried to convince Mickiewicz and his other acquaintances in Paris that Jelacić was 
not so devoted to Austria as it might have seemed and that his policy would be purely Slavic. He 
also claimed Jelacić acted against the Hungarian revolution solely due to a provocation made 
by the Hungarian nobility. (…) The fact is that Brlić’s visit to Paris and coming into contact 
with Mickiewicz led to an absence of criticism towards Croatians and Jelacić’s actions in “La 
Tribune des Peuples”. It seems that Brlić managed to convince Mickiewicz that Croatia’s policy 
towards Austria was only temporary.” (Batowski, 1980: 58). As I will show in the remainder of 
the present analysis, not all of Batowski’s theses can be substantiated.    
2 A. T. Bertlich, Tentances des Slaves du Midi, „La Tribune des Peuples”, 22.03.1849
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he accused of the desire to annex Slavs’ indigenous lands. The Hungarian leaders 
were described as unwilling to reconcile, which worked to Austria’s benefit. It 
meant that Jelačić was willing to act more independently towards Vienna were 
it not for the belligerent attitude of Hungarians. He spoke in a similar fashion 
during his private conversations with Mickiewicz who, according to him, had 
a friendly attitude to Jelačić and shared his opinion that a full reconciliation with 
Hungarians was unfeasible (this is what he wrote in his diary (Durković-Jaksić, 
1984: 129-130), but it remains uncertain whether he depicted Mickiewicz’s 
opinions accurately).   
Instead of describing the issues of South Slavs in “La Tribune”, Mickiewicz 
concentrated more on an insightful analysis of the European strategy of Tsar 
Nicholas I as well as the situation in Italy and Hungary where hopes for the 
Central European geopolitical change crumbled with the subsequent defeats of 
the uprisings. The name of Jelačić was mentioned in this respect once only, in 
an article entitled Russia which was published in the 9th issue of the newspaper 
on 23 March 1849. The ban was listed there among the leaders who acted in 
favor of repressing the European revolution of nations, by which, nolens volens, 
they support the realization of Russia’s strategy3. The strongest pronouncement 
about the Croatian-Hungarian conflict appeared in a text entitled An appeal to 
Hungarians whose authorship is attributed to Mickiewicz, though not confirmed. 
The appeal was published in the 38th issue on 22 April 1849 and was signed by 
“the editors of La Tribune”. It includes the following paragraph: “When our fellow 
Slavs, bearing an erroneous grudge against the past, with which you cannot feel 
solidarity, got led on to such an extent that they stood under the spiteful banner 
of tyranny in order to help in the fight against you, we warned them, bemoaned 
their error and never stopped to hope that one day, with clearer minds, they will 
unite with us to fight arm in arm for our common freedom” (Mickiewicz, 1997: 
330). The meaning of this fragment is clear. The editors of “La Tribune” admit 
that in the past there was harm that the Slavs sustained from the Hungarians, but 
this past fact does not work to the detriment of the revolutionary government 
fighting with the Habsburg Empire which enslaves the Slavs. In such a situation, 
all the Slavs together with the Hungarians should unite under the banner of 
freedom and make a common effort to topple the despotic state. The truth 
3 The relevant quotation goes as follows: „Radetzky receives his pay from Petersburg; from there 
he most likely receives his orders. It is certain that in Petersburg they already know Radetzky’s 
future plans and speak about it openly. They say if Radetzky could not rival Piemont, he would 
retreat to Adiga. He would make effort to stay in touch with Frulia and Iliria and would wait at 
that position for a quick arrival of Windischgraetz and Jelacić’s armies (Mickiewicz, 1997: 56).
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was, frankly speaking, more complex. Attempts to reconcile the opposing sides 
(that is Hungarian and Slavic, especially Croatian) taken by Prince Czartoryski 
failed, especially that Hungarians’ willingness to compromise was rather limited. 
Mickiewicz knew the situation was not easy and the choice the Croatians were 
to make could not be described in black and white colors, as Brlić himself 
confirmed. The appeal quoted above was a form of a manifesto supporting the 
Hungarians’ fight, as, at that moment, they had become the last resort, the final 
hope for changes in the political situation of Central Europe. For this reason, 
they were praised, agreed with and cheered to continue the fight. The poetics 
of the appeal determined the rules of discourse. Nevertheless, it is doubtless 
that among the editors of the newspaper Jelačić’s decision to get involved in 
the campaign on the Hungarian territory was perceived as a strategic error for 
which both the Hungarians and the Croatians would pay a very high price. The 
Polish emigration understood Jelačić’s policy of defending his nation’s rights and 
territory but a military action outside his country’s borders targeted against a 
neighboring state fighting for its full sovereignty could not find acceptance. 
Conclusion
According to Mickiewicz the collapse of the liberation movements in Central 
Europe was the consequence of the lack of profound cooperation between the 
enslaved nations, inadequate understanding on the part of the countries’ elites 
that despotism, even if it treats certain of the enslaved nations more leniently, 
should still remain the enemy for all the nations, as the nature of this system 
rests in the attempts to treat the annexed countries as material which needs 
to be completely subdued and spiritually neutered. Once again in the history 
of the world destructive egoism triumphed over solidarity. Mickiewicz wrote 
in “La Tribune” in October 1849: “This is how countries perish in the decisive 
moments of history. Their own egoism brings them doom and history should 
not show mercy to them”. He reminded Hungarians their lack of support for the 
Polish issue in 1831. The Czechs were accused of indifference towards the just-
throttled Hungarian movement and in this context the poet raised the question 
about the future of the Balkan Slavs. “Is this not the history of our times? When 
Poland was partitioned, the Hungarian regiments which were used by the 
Austrians to disarm the Polish army were ordered to give out the Polish arms 
to Russia. The time has now come for Hungary and this time Czechs remain 
indifferent, if not even hostile. The future of the Czechs is easily predictable. We 
shall see how Ilirians and Danube Slavs will react then” (Mickiewicz , 1997: 269). 
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“The solidarity of nations” which he wrote about many times in “La Tribune” did 
not stand the test of time; it proved too weak to destroy the empires. His project 
of the new order in Central Europe which was the motivation for establishing 
the legion remained a dream which was unfulfilled, but not abandoned for long. 
Five years later, motivated by similar premises, Mickiewicz got involved in the 
Crimean War, though now he was less hopeful for the cooperation of the Slavic 
nations. This time, he pinned his hopes with Emperor Napoleon III’s faithfulness 
to the Napoleonic idea.         
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Sažetak
U četrdesetim godinama 19. stoljeća, Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) smatran 
je jednim od najvećih pisaca poljskoga romantizma. Ne samo to, on je bio jedan 
od najpoznatijih Poljaka u Europi, sa snažnim političkim angažmanom, poznat 
po suprotstavljanju svim oblicima političkog despotizma. U dobu Europske 
revolucije 1848.-1849., ušao je u političku sferu sa značajnim impulsom i, 
među ostalim, računajući na Balkan da postane jedna od glavnih pozornica 
anti-austrijske kampanje, uvjeren da, posebice među Hrvatima, postoji snažan 
potencijal i volja za pobunom. Njegove ideje o tome sukobile su se s austro-
slavizmom i nekoliko drugih pogleda i na kraju ih je porazila Jelačićeva politika. 
Urušavanje oslobodilačkih pokreta u Središnjoj Europi je, prema njegovu 
mišljenju, bilo posljedica manjka bitne suradnje između porobljenih nacija i on 
je to smatrao trijumfom destruktivnog egoizma nad solidarnošću.
Ključne riječi: Adam Mickiewicz, anti-austrijski pokret, revolucija 1848., 
Balkan, slavenske nacije
